lifeguard-in-lanes

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted data from external sources, specifically GitHub issue bodies and comments, which could be controlled by third parties.
  • Ingestion points: Reads issue body, comments (including specific tags like CHECK-IN, HANDOFF, STUCK, DONE), and PR details from GitHub using the gh CLI as defined in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or use "ignore instructions" wrappers when parsing the content of these comments, increasing the risk of the agent following instructions embedded within them.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to send messages to other agent sessions (SendMessage), push notifications to the user (PushNotification), and interact with the GitHub API (gh api, gh pr view). A successful injection could misuse these tools to spam users or exfiltrate state information.
  • Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering logic is described for the external content before it is used to determine the agent's next action.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of shell-based commands (gh CLI) to perform its monitoring tasks. While these tools are standard, the inputs (such as PR identifiers and commit SHAs) are retrieved from untrusted issue comments, which presents a surface for potential command injection if the underlying tool execution is not properly managed by the platform.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 1, 2026, 01:25 AM