skill-stocktake
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local shell scripts (
scan.sh,quick-diff.sh,save-results.sh) to perform inventory management and state tracking. - These scripts follow security best practices, such as using
set -euo pipefailfor error handling,mktempfor safe temporary file creation, andjq --argto prevent command injection when handling JSON data. - Path handling includes defense-in-depth checks to verify that project-level skill directories follow expected naming conventions (e.g., matching
*/.codex/skills*). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection during the quality evaluation phase (Phase 2).
- Ingestion points: The content of all audited skills (including frontmatter and body) is read from the filesystem and interpolated into the
[INVENTORY]block of the subagent's prompt inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no protective delimiters or explicit instructions to the subagent to ignore embedded commands within the audited data, increasing the risk that the agent will follow instructions contained within the analyzed files.
- Capability inventory: The subagent used for evaluation is a "general-purpose" agent which, according to the checklist, may use
WebSearchto verify references, providing an avenue for the subagent to be influenced into making untrusted network requests. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping is performed on the content of the audited skills before they are passed to the subagent. This allows a malicious skill to include instructions that override the auditing agent's behavior (e.g., instructions to always return a "Keep" verdict regardless of quality).
Audit Metadata