video-frames
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/extract_frames.pyinvokes external binariesffmpegandffprobeto process video files. While it uses argument lists to avoid shell injection, it dynamically constructs complex filter strings forffmpeg. The--timestampsfeature interpolates the video's filename directly into thedrawtextfilter without escaping single quotes or colons. A maliciously crafted filename (e.g., containing') could break the filter's syntax, allowing for filter graph manipulation within theffmpegprocess. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted video files and feed the resulting frames to an LLM, creating a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection where visual content (text or images) contains instructions intended to manipulate the agent. * Ingestion points: Video files provided by the user are processed by
scripts/extract_frames.pyas described inSKILL.md. * Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not advise the agent to treat extracted visual content as potentially adversarial. * Capability inventory: The skill can read from the local filesystem, write images to a temporary directory, and executeffmpegsubprocesses. * Sanitization: Absent. The script extracts and scales frames without verifying the safety of the content within them.
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