skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/analyzing-active-directory-acl-abuse/Gen Agent Trust Hub
analyzing-active-directory-acl-abuse
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The script
scripts/agent.pyingests data directly from Active Directory environments (such as object names, SIDs, and security descriptors) and incorporates this untrusted data into its final JSON report. While this is a necessary function for the skill's purpose, it creates a potential surface for indirect injection if an attacker can control AD object attributes. - Ingestion points: LDAP search entries retrieved via
conn.searchinscripts/agent.py. - Boundary markers: None explicitly used to separate external data from internal logic within the script flow.
- Capability inventory: The script has the capability to write the resulting report to a user-specified file path using the
--outputCLI argument. - Sanitization: The script mitigates risk by using standard
json.dumpsfor serialization, which prevents many common injection vectors into the final output file. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill performs network operations to connect to an Active Directory Domain Controller. It requires a domain username and password, which are passed as command-line arguments (
--usernameand--password). While standard for such tools, this practice carries the risk of credentials appearing in process listings. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill references the
ldap3Python package as a prerequisite. This is a well-known, legitimate library for LDAP operations and is appropriate for the skill's stated purpose.
Audit Metadata