conducting-domain-persistence-with-dcsync

HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

• Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill explicitly instructs dumping and reusing credentials and hashes and includes command examples that embed secrets (e.g., secretsdump.py domain.local/admin:'Password123' and mimikatz /krbtgt:<krbtgt_ntlm_hash>), so the agent would need to handle and output secret values verbatim.

CRITICAL E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.

• Malicious code pattern detected (high risk: 1.00). This content is explicitly malicious: it provides actionable, step‑by‑step instructions and tooling to perform credential theft (DCSync/NTDS dumps), forge persistent backdoors (KRBTGT/Golden Tickets and granting DS‑Replication rights to controlled accounts), and escalate access via relays — all clear indicators of deliberate abuse and persistence/backdoor behavior.

MEDIUM W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

• Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill explicitly instructs extracting domain credentials, modifying Active Directory ACLs to grant DCSync rights, creating Golden Tickets, and using tools (Mimikatz, secretsdump, PowerView, ntlmrelayx) to establish persistent, unauthorized domain-level access—actions that alter system/AD state and create persistence.