skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/configuring-network-segmentation-with-vlans/Gen Agent Trust Hub
configuring-network-segmentation-with-vlans
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The provided automation script (
scripts/agent.py) presents a potential command injection surface on target network switches. - Ingestion points: Variable inputs for
vlan_idandvlan_nameare used in several functions includingcreate_vlan,configure_access_port, andconfigure_trunk_port. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not provide delimiters or instructions for the agent to treat user-supplied network plans as data rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: The script utilizes the
netmikolibrary to execute privileged configuration commands (send_config_set) on network switches. - Sanitization: The script performs no validation, range checking, or escaping on the
vlan_idorvlan_namevariables before interpolating them into command strings (e.g.,f"vlan {vlan_id}"). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/agent.pyscript accepts sensitive authentication credentials (--usernameand--password) as plain-text command-line arguments. This is a common but insecure practice as these credentials may be exposed in system process lists or shell history logs. - [METADATA_POISONING]: There is an inconsistency in the author attribution. The skill frontmatter in
SKILL.mdlists the author as 'mahipal', whereas theLICENSEfile attributes the copyright to 'mukul975'. While this may be a simple oversight, it constitutes misleading metadata.
Audit Metadata