skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/detecting-deepfake-audio-in-vishing-attacks/Gen Agent Trust Hub
detecting-deepfake-audio-in-vishing-attacks
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/agent.pyfile usesjoblib.load()to load machine learning models from disk. This function relies onpickle-based deserialization, which is inherently unsafe and can be exploited to achieve arbitrary code execution if a maliciously crafted file is loaded. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted audio data and generates text-based summaries that are processed by the agent, creating a vulnerability to indirect injection.
- Ingestion points: External audio files (WAV, MP3, FLAC) are loaded in
scripts/agent.pyusinglibrosa. - Boundary markers: Absent. The tool's output is not wrapped in protective delimiters to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in the data summaries.
- Capability inventory: The skill has file system access (read/write) and code execution capabilities via model loading in
scripts/agent.py. - Sanitization: Absent. No sanitization or filtering is performed on the content of the forensic reports before they are provided to the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The audio processing workflow depends on
librosa, which invokesFFmpegas an external subprocess for audio manipulation and transcoding. This constitutes an indirect command execution surface.
Audit Metadata