detecting-deepfake-audio-in-vishing-attacks

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The scripts/agent.py file uses joblib.load() to load machine learning models from disk. This function relies on pickle-based deserialization, which is inherently unsafe and can be exploited to achieve arbitrary code execution if a maliciously crafted file is loaded.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted audio data and generates text-based summaries that are processed by the agent, creating a vulnerability to indirect injection.
  • Ingestion points: External audio files (WAV, MP3, FLAC) are loaded in scripts/agent.py using librosa.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The tool's output is not wrapped in protective delimiters to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in the data summaries.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has file system access (read/write) and code execution capabilities via model loading in scripts/agent.py.
  • Sanitization: Absent. No sanitization or filtering is performed on the content of the forensic reports before they are provided to the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The audio processing workflow depends on librosa, which invokes FFmpeg as an external subprocess for audio manipulation and transcoding. This constitutes an indirect command execution surface.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 22, 2026, 06:32 AM