skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/detecting-insider-threat-behaviors/Gen Agent Trust Hub
detecting-insider-threat-behaviors
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a theoretical attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to its design, which involves the ingestion and processing of untrusted external log data.
- Ingestion points: The scripts
scripts/agent.pyandscripts/process.pyare designed to read external log files (JSON or CSV) provided via the--activity-logor--inputcommand-line arguments. - Boundary markers: The processing scripts do not implement specific boundary markers or "ignore" instructions to prevent the agent from potentially responding to commands embedded within the log data during analysis.
- Capability inventory:
scripts/agent.pyis capable of reading files and outputting results to the console.scripts/process.pycan read files, create local directories, and write reports or findings to the local file system. No network access or subprocess execution capabilities were found. - Sanitization: While the scripts use standard data parsers (
jsonandcsv) to process the files, they do not perform semantic sanitization to identify or neutralize potential prompt injection payloads within the log entries.
Audit Metadata