detecting-privilege-escalation-in-kubernetes-pods

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The Python scripts scripts/agent.py and scripts/process.py utilize the subprocess module to execute kubectl commands locally. This is used to retrieve pod configuration data from the active Kubernetes cluster for auditing purposes.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes pod metadata (such as names and namespaces) retrieved from the cluster environment. This creates a potential vulnerability surface where maliciously named resources in a cluster could attempt to influence an AI agent's interpretation of the audit results.
  • Ingestion points: Pod specifications retrieved via kubectl get pods -o json in scripts/agent.py and scripts/process.py.
  • Boundary markers: The scripts do not use specific delimiters or instructions to treat pod metadata as untrusted when generating output.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to run system commands and read cluster-wide resource configurations.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping is performed on pod metadata before it is printed to standard output.
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: There is a discrepancy between the author identified in the SKILL.md frontmatter ("mahipal") and the copyright holder listed in the LICENSE file ("mukul975"), indicating inconsistent metadata.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 14, 2026, 11:26 PM