exploiting-bgp-hijacking-vulnerabilities

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads an installation script from https://get.containerlab.dev, a well-known service for managing network lab environments.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The installation process involves piping a remote script to bash -c. Additionally, the skill installs packages such as bgpalerter and pybgpstream via standard package managers.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Administrative privileges (sudo) are employed to install orchestration tools and deploy virtual routing topologies, which is a standard requirement for this type of network security testing.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: A Python script is dynamically generated and executed at runtime using a heredoc pattern to process historical BGP update records.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes live and historical routing data from the RIPEstat API. Although RIPEstat is a trusted organization, the skill does not implement sanitization or boundary markers when interpolating this external content into its reporting output (Ingestion points: agent.py and SKILL.md; Boundary markers: Absent; Capability inventory: Network access, local file writing, and shell command execution; Sanitization: Absent).
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://get.containerlab.dev, https://stat.ripe.net/data/rpki-validation/data.json?resource=AS65001&prefix=10.0.0.0/24 - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 22, 2026, 05:25 AM