skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/implementing-ebpf-security-monitoring/Gen Agent Trust Hub
implementing-ebpf-security-monitoring
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mdrequire the use ofsudoto install the Tetragon and Tetra binaries to/usr/local/bin/and to run the Tetragon daemon. These elevated privileges are necessary and expected for loading eBPF programs into the Linux kernel. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]:
SKILL.mdandreferences/api-reference.mdprovide instructions to download Tetragon releases directly from the official Cilium GitHub repository (github.com/cilium/tetragon). This is a well-known service and an appropriate source for the software. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/agent.pyfile uses thesubprocessmodule to programmatically executekubectl,helm, andtetracommands for cluster management, deployment, and event streaming. The commands are constructed using lists, which follows security best practices to prevent shell injection. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a potential surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes external data.
- Ingestion points: The
parse_tetragon_logfunction inscripts/agent.pyreads and parses JSON log files generated by the Tetragon daemon. - Boundary markers: None identified in the parsing logic; the script treats all lines in the log as trusted JSON input.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses the capability to execute system commands via
subprocess(e.g.,kubectl,helm). - Sanitization: The script performs basic JSON parsing and field extraction (binary paths, function names) without explicit sanitization or validation against a strict schema. While the risk is low, malicious processes on a monitored system could potentially craft execution patterns that generate misleading logs to influence the agent's behavior.
Audit Metadata