skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/implementing-memory-protection-with-dep-aslr/Gen Agent Trust Hub
implementing-memory-protection-with-dep-aslr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The Python scripts
scripts/agent.pyandscripts/process.pyutilizesubprocess.runto call system utilities likebcdedit,powershell, andreadelf. These commands are used to inspect and report on system configuration and process metadata for security auditing purposes. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Instructions within
SKILL.mdand the audit scripts involve high-privilege operations, such as modifying the Windows Boot Configuration Data (bcdedit /set nx AlwaysOn) and system-wide exploit protection settings. These activities are appropriate and necessary for the skill's stated objective of endpoint security hardening. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a theoretical attack surface for indirect injection through metadata processing:
- Ingestion points: File names and paths are read via
os.walkinscripts/agent.py, and process names are retrieved via PowerShell inscripts/process.py. - Boundary markers: None present; the tools process the collected metadata directly as input for audit utilities.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes subprocesses (
readelf,powershell) using the collected metadata and writes results to local JSON files. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of file paths or process names is performed before they are passed to audit commands, though the use of
subprocess.runwithoutshell=Trueprevents direct shell command injection.
Audit Metadata