skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/implementing-mobile-application-management/Gen Agent Trust Hub
implementing-mobile-application-management
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/agent.pyexecutes thecurlbinary viasubprocess.runto communicate with external MDM APIs. While the arguments are passed as a list to prevent basic shell injection, the reliance on external system binaries and the handling of sensitive credentials (tokens) via command-line arguments are notable behaviors. Evidence:cmd = ["curl", "-s", "-X", method, ...]inscripts/agent.py. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests data from external MDM/UEM API endpoints. This data, which includes device names, app inventory, and policy settings, is untrusted and could be crafted to include malicious instructions. 1. Ingestion points: API responses in
scripts/agent.pyviaget_managed_devices,get_managed_apps, and other policy retrieval functions. 2. Boundary markers: None present in the processed JSON output or report generation to distinguish untrusted data from instructions. 3. Capability inventory: Shell command execution (subprocess.runinscripts/agent.py) and local file system write access in bothscripts/agent.pyandscripts/process.py. 4. Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or escaping of the ingested strings is performed before they are included in the final audit reports.
Audit Metadata