implementing-policy-as-code-with-open-policy-agent

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted infrastructure configuration files such as Kubernetes manifests and Terraform files, then incorporates the resulting tool outputs and violation messages into the agent context. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if an attacker crafts manifests designed to generate malicious violation messages that influence the agent's behavior. 1. Ingestion points: scripts/process.py (scans directories for config files), scripts/agent.py (reads policy and input data). 2. Boundary markers: Absent. 3. Capability inventory: Command execution via subprocess.run for opa, conftest, and kubectl in scripts/agent.py and scripts/process.py; report file writing. 4. Sanitization: Absent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses subprocess.run to execute standard security CLI tools including opa, conftest, and kubectl. Commands are constructed as lists of strings rather than single strings executed in a shell, which minimizes the risk of command injection.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download conftest from GitHub and opa from the official project website. These are well-known and reputable sources within the cybersecurity and DevOps domains.
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: There is a minor inconsistency in author metadata between the skill frontmatter (mahipal) and the license file (mukul975), which may cause confusion regarding the skill's origin.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 21, 2026, 04:09 AM