skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/implementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes/Gen Agent Trust Hub
implementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The audit scripts
scripts/agent.pyandscripts/process.pyexecute thekubectlcommand-line tool to retrieve cluster configuration. These executions are constrained to hardcoded subcommands and arguments derived from predefined internal lists or specific user-supplied flags, following best practices for subprocess management without shell evaluation. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through the ingestion of external cluster configuration data.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via the output of
kubectlcommands processed inscripts/agent.pyandscripts/process.py. - Boundary markers: Absent.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution (
kubectl) and local file writing for reporting purposes inscripts/agent.pyandscripts/process.py. - Sanitization: Present; the scripts utilize structured JSON parsing via
json.loadsand specific field access to validate and isolate data before processing.
Audit Metadata