skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/implementing-taxii-server-with-opentaxii/Gen Agent Trust Hub
implementing-taxii-server-with-opentaxii
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX) objects from external TAXII servers, representing a surface for instructions embedded in external data.
- Ingestion points: The
TAXIIConsumer.poll_collectionmethod inSKILL.mdand thescripts/agent.pyaudit tool ingest objects from potentially untrusted third-party TAXII server endpoints. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present when processing the threat intelligence bundles.
- Capability inventory: The skill includes logic to push ingested data to external platforms like Splunk and Elasticsearch via network requests and writes metadata to local JSON files (
taxii_data.json). - Sanitization: Data fields such as object descriptions and names are extracted and forwarded to SIEM platforms without sanitization or validation of the content.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill configuration and documentation instruct the installation of various Python packages from public registries.
- Evidence: The
docker-compose.ymlfile inSKILL.mdexecutespip install medallionat container startup, andreferences/api-reference.mdlists commands to installopentaxii,taxii2-client,stix2, andrequests. - Sources: The skill targets standard, well-known libraries from the cybersecurity domain (e.g., OASIS Open CTI implementations).
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Deployment instructions rely on shell command execution to manage dependencies and launch server instances.
- Evidence: The
commandfield in the Docker service definition inSKILL.mdusesbash -cto chain package installation and service execution.
Audit Metadata