skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/performing-file-carving-with-foremost/Gen Agent Trust Hub
performing-file-carving-with-foremost
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runinscripts/agent.pyto execute forensic tools includingforemost,scalpel, andfile. All subprocess calls use argument lists rather than shell strings, which effectively prevents shell command injection vulnerabilities. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The setup instructions in
SKILL.mdincludesudo apt-get installcommands to install the necessary forensic utilities. This use of elevated privileges is standard for software installation on a forensic workstation and is appropriate for the skill's domain. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The workflow in
SKILL.mdincludes Python script blocks executed via shell redirection (e.g.,python3 << 'PYEOF'). These scripts automate the validation of carved files and the generation of evidence catalogs, representing a routine use of script generation for task automation. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted disk images and search through recovered file contents (e.g., searching for keywords in carved PDFs). While this creates a theoretical attack surface for indirect prompt injection from the processed data, the skill does not explicitly feed the extracted content back into the agent's control loop for instruction following.
- Ingestion points: Raw disk images and carved files (PDFs, images, etc.) processed by forensic tools and Python scripts.
- Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt interpolation steps.
- Capability inventory: File system access (read/write/delete), command execution for forensic tools, and logging.
- Sanitization: No specific content filtering is applied to the data extracted from the disk images before metadata extraction or keyword searching.
Audit Metadata