performing-initial-access-with-evilginx3

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSOBFUSCATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill's operational instructions in SKILL.md explicitly direct the use of elevated privileges via sudo to execute the phishing framework (e.g., sudo ./bin/evilginx -p ./phishlets).
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow involves shell command execution for installing and operating tools. Specifically, SKILL.md includes commands for building the framework with make and executing it. Furthermore, scripts/agent.py uses subprocess.run to execute evilginx --version to verify the environment.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill workflow requires downloading code from external GitHub repositories that are not on the trusted list, including https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2.git and https://github.com/fin3ss3g0d/evilgophish.
  • [OBFUSCATION]: The instructions in SKILL.md (Phase 1) recommend the registration of lookalike domains using homoglyphs or typosquatting to create deceptive landing pages for targets.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's analysis scripts present a surface for indirect prompt injection through the ingestion of external data.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/agent.py reads and parses external YAML phishlet files and session logs; scripts/process.py processes raw session output.
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the processing scripts to separate untrusted data from instructions.
  • Capability inventory: scripts/agent.py contains capability for subprocess command execution.
  • Sanitization: While scripts/agent.py uses yaml.safe_load() to prevent unsafe deserialization of phishlets, it does not sanitize the content of the logs or phishlets against potential prompt injection attacks within the agent's context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 20, 2026, 01:44 PM