skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/performing-initial-access-with-evilginx3/Gen Agent Trust Hub
performing-initial-access-with-evilginx3
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSOBFUSCATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill's operational instructions in
SKILL.mdexplicitly direct the use of elevated privileges viasudoto execute the phishing framework (e.g.,sudo ./bin/evilginx -p ./phishlets). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow involves shell command execution for installing and operating tools. Specifically,
SKILL.mdincludes commands for building the framework withmakeand executing it. Furthermore,scripts/agent.pyusessubprocess.runto executeevilginx --versionto verify the environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill workflow requires downloading code from external GitHub repositories that are not on the trusted list, including
https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2.gitandhttps://github.com/fin3ss3g0d/evilgophish. - [OBFUSCATION]: The instructions in
SKILL.md(Phase 1) recommend the registration of lookalike domains using homoglyphs or typosquatting to create deceptive landing pages for targets. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's analysis scripts present a surface for indirect prompt injection through the ingestion of external data.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/agent.pyreads and parses external YAML phishlet files and session logs;scripts/process.pyprocesses raw session output. - Boundary markers: None identified in the processing scripts to separate untrusted data from instructions.
- Capability inventory:
scripts/agent.pycontains capability for subprocess command execution. - Sanitization: While
scripts/agent.pyusesyaml.safe_load()to prevent unsafe deserialization of phishlets, it does not sanitize the content of the logs or phishlets against potential prompt injection attacks within the agent's context.
Audit Metadata