performing-purple-team-exercise

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The workflow documentation in SKILL.md and references/api-reference.md provides instructions to download and execute a remote PowerShell script (install-atomicredteam.ps1) from the Red Canary repository on GitHub using the IEX (IWR ...) pattern. While this targets a well-known security tool, the execution of remote scripts is a significant capability.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The scripts/agent.py utility processes external data in the form of test plans and records results, which are then used to generate reports.
  • Ingestion points: The PurpleTeamAgent.load_test_plan method in scripts/agent.py reads and parses JSON data from a user-provided file path.
  • Boundary markers: The script does not utilize specific delimiters or provide instructions to the AI agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the ingested test plan content.
  • Capability inventory: The agent script possesses the capability to write JSON report files to the local file system (via generate_report) and output the full test plan content to the standard output, where it could influence the AI agent's context.
  • Sanitization: The script lacks validation or sanitization of strings within the ingested JSON fields before they are included in generated reports or printed to the terminal.
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: There is an inconsistency in the skill's metadata; the YAML frontmatter in SKILL.md identifies the author as 'mahipal', whereas the LICENSE file attributes the copyright to 'mukul975'. This discrepancy in author attribution is misleading.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 14, 2026, 05:51 PM