performing-purple-team-exercise
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The workflow documentation in
SKILL.mdandreferences/api-reference.mdprovides instructions to download and execute a remote PowerShell script (install-atomicredteam.ps1) from the Red Canary repository on GitHub using theIEX (IWR ...)pattern. While this targets a well-known security tool, the execution of remote scripts is a significant capability. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
scripts/agent.pyutility processes external data in the form of test plans and records results, which are then used to generate reports. - Ingestion points: The
PurpleTeamAgent.load_test_planmethod inscripts/agent.pyreads and parses JSON data from a user-provided file path. - Boundary markers: The script does not utilize specific delimiters or provide instructions to the AI agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the ingested test plan content.
- Capability inventory: The agent script possesses the capability to write JSON report files to the local file system (via
generate_report) and output the full test plan content to the standard output, where it could influence the AI agent's context. - Sanitization: The script lacks validation or sanitization of strings within the ingested JSON fields before they are included in generated reports or printed to the terminal.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: There is an inconsistency in the skill's metadata; the YAML frontmatter in
SKILL.mdidentifies the author as 'mahipal', whereas theLICENSEfile attributes the copyright to 'mukul975'. This discrepancy in author attribution is misleading.
Audit Metadata