performing-ssl-stripping-attack
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The workflow instructions require the use of
sudoto modify system-level kernel parameters (net.ipv4.ip_forward), manage firewall rules viaiptables, and execute network interception tools such asbettercapandarpspoof. These operations are consistent with the skill's primary purpose of network security testing and simulation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The assessment script (
scripts/agent.py) usessubprocess.runto execute thecurlutility to inspect HSTS headers and redirect chains. The skill also documents the use of external tools likeBettercap,sslstrip2, andWiresharkfor intercepting and analyzing network traffic. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Automated scanning flagged a remote code execution pattern in
SKILL.md. Analysis confirms this is a false positive: the commandcurl -s "https://hstspreload.org/api/v2/status?domain=example.com" | python3 -m json.tooluses the Python standard library'sjson.toolmodule to pretty-print JSON data fetched from a well-known service; it does not execute the remote content as code. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
agent.pyscript processes data from external URLs, representing a potential surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: Data is ingested via
curlfrom user-specified target URLs and the officialhstspreload.orgAPI (inscripts/agent.pyat lines 21, 41, 62, and 79). - Boundary markers: The script does not utilize boundary markers or delimiters when processing output from external tools.
- Capability inventory: The script's capabilities are limited to executing
curlviasubprocess.run(lines 14, 42, 57, 72, and 85) for assessment purposes and does not have file-writing or persistent network capabilities. - Sanitization: Content retrieved from external sources is printed to the console without sanitization or escaping.
Audit Metadata