testing-for-sensitive-data-exposure

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests and processes untrusted data from remote target URLs. A malicious target server could provide crafted responses (HTML, JS, or JSON) designed to influence the agent's behavior or output.
  • Ingestion points: The scripts/agent.py script (using requests.get) and the SKILL.md workflow (using curl) fetch content from user-provided target URLs.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the processing logic.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for network operations (requests, curl), filesystem writes (generate_report function), and shell command execution (grep, jq, git-dumper).
  • Sanitization: Content is analyzed via regex patterns and JSON key extraction, but raw response content from external servers is not sanitized before processing.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow in SKILL.md contains complex shell command pipelines (using curl, grep, tr, and while loops) that execute logic based on data fetched from remote sources.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's primary function involves downloading resources from external targets, including JavaScript files, environment configurations (.env), and version control metadata (.git).
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: There is a discrepancy in the skill metadata where the author name provided in the YAML frontmatter (mahipal) does not match the author name in the license file and context (mukul975).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 08:09 PM