secure-mule-app

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads an executable JAR file from a remote documentation site.
  • Evidence: It fetches secure-properties-tool.jar from https://docs.mulesoft.com/mule-runtime/4.4/_attachments/secure-properties-tool.jar.
  • Context: The download targets the official MuleSoft documentation domain, which is the vendor associated with the skill.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a Java-based command using the downloaded JAR to encrypt values.
  • Evidence: The instruction in SKILL.md (Step 8) uses java -cp to run the encryption tool, passing an algorithm, mode, key, and value as arguments.
  • Risk: The command interpolates values extracted directly from the project's XML and properties files. The lack of explicit shell escaping for the <value> parameter could potentially allow for command injection if the scanned files contain malicious shell metacharacters.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill identifies an indirect prompt injection surface as it processes external, potentially untrusted project data.
  • Ingestion points: Scans XML files in src/main/mule and properties/YAML files in src/main/resources (Step 4).
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or specific instructions to ignore embedded prompts are used during the scanning and processing phase.
  • Capability inventory: Includes the ability to execute shell commands (java), perform network requests (curl, wget), and modify project configuration files (pom.xml, launch.json, .gitignore).
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of the extracted data before it is passed to the encryption command or written back to configuration files.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 15, 2026, 05:34 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — secure-mule-app