secure-mule-app
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads an executable JAR file from a remote documentation site.
- Evidence: It fetches
secure-properties-tool.jarfromhttps://docs.mulesoft.com/mule-runtime/4.4/_attachments/secure-properties-tool.jar. - Context: The download targets the official MuleSoft documentation domain, which is the vendor associated with the skill.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a Java-based command using the downloaded JAR to encrypt values.
- Evidence: The instruction in
SKILL.md(Step 8) usesjava -cpto run the encryption tool, passing an algorithm, mode, key, and value as arguments. - Risk: The command interpolates values extracted directly from the project's XML and properties files. The lack of explicit shell escaping for the
<value>parameter could potentially allow for command injection if the scanned files contain malicious shell metacharacters. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill identifies an indirect prompt injection surface as it processes external, potentially untrusted project data.
- Ingestion points: Scans XML files in
src/main/muleand properties/YAML files insrc/main/resources(Step 4). - Boundary markers: No delimiters or specific instructions to ignore embedded prompts are used during the scanning and processing phase.
- Capability inventory: Includes the ability to execute shell commands (
java), perform network requests (curl,wget), and modify project configuration files (pom.xml,launch.json,.gitignore). - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of the extracted data before it is passed to the encryption command or written back to configuration files.
Audit Metadata