skills/muratcankoylan/agent-skills-for-context-engineering/context-engineering-collection/Gen Agent Trust Hub
context-engineering-collection
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The example script
examples/interleaved-thinking/examples/03_full_optimization.pyimplements a mock calculator tool using the Pythoneval()function. Although it attempts to sandbox the execution by restricting__builtins__and using a whitelist of math functions,eval()is notoriously difficult to secure in Python and can often be bypassed to achieve arbitrary code execution. - [PERSISTENCE]: The repository includes a 'Continuous loop' feature for its researcher component, which uses macOS
launchdservice definitions (located inresearcher/orchestration/launchd/) to automatically run scripts likeloop_step.pyandloop_daily.pyat regular intervals or on startup. This is intended functionality for the 'Researcher Operating System' described in the project documentation. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The script
examples/long-horizon-prompt-lab/scripts/fetch_report.shdownloads PDF files fromcdn.openai.com. These are used as research artifacts for the long-horizon prompting skill. Whileopenai.comis a well-known service, the skill's continuous loop also fetches content from arbitrary URLs provided in the research queue. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The 'Researcher' and 'Evaluation' components (e.g.,
examples/llm-as-judge-skills/src/tools/evaluation/direct-score.tsandresearcher/scripts/loop_step.py) ingest external, untrusted data from URLs or files and interpolate them directly into LLM prompts for analysis, scoring, or synthesis. This creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in research sources could influence the agent's behavior during the research loop.
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