hunt-k8s
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes patterns that pipe output from remote network targets directly into a Python interpreter for processing. While these instances are configured for JSON formatting or basic counting, the structural pattern is identified as a high-risk vector for remote code execution if the target returns malicious payloads.
- Evidence in SKILL.md:
curl -s "http://$TARGET:10255/pods" | python3 -m json.tool - Evidence in SKILL.md:
curl -s "http://$TARGET:2379/v2/keys/?recursive=true" | python3 -m json.tool - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses shell commands that incorporate variables (such as $TARGET, $POD, $NS, $TOKEN) without explicit sanitization, creating a potential command injection surface if the agent provides malformed inputs.
- Evidence: Shell blocks in Phase 1, Phase 2, and Phase 3 using
curl,nmap, andnmapvariables. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill executes dynamic Python code blocks via the
-cflag to process JSON data retrieved from the network. - Evidence in Phase 2:
python3 -c 'import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(len(d.get("items",[])),"secrets")' - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface where instructions could be injected via the data retrieved from audited targets.
- Ingestion points: Responses from Kubernetes API endpoints, etcd keys, and pod logs ingested via
curlandetcdctl. - Boundary markers: None. Untrusted data is directly passed to the agent context or piped to other shell utilities.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to network tools (
curl,nmap), WebSocket clients (websocat), and Python interpreters. - Sanitization: No validation or filtering is performed on data retrieved from external IP addresses or services.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill identifies and accesses sensitive file paths and cloud metadata services to retrieve credentials.
- Evidence: Targeted access to
/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token. - Evidence: Commands targeting the Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) at
169.254.169.254for AWS, Azure, and GCP to harvest security credentials.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: http://$TARGET:10255/pods, http://$TARGET:2379/v2/keys/?recursive=true - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata