m365-entra-attack

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous shell commands for target reconnaissance and includes Python and Playwright scripts for automated credential validation.\n
  • Evidence: msftrecon -d client.example in SKILL.md.\n
  • Evidence: The authentication script disables SSL verification (ssl.CERT_NONE) and the browser-based flow ignores certificate errors (--ignore-certificate-errors), making authentication traffic vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle attacks.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill requires downloading and installing third-party tools from external, unverified repositories.\n
  • Evidence: pip install --break-system-packages msftrecon o365spray and go install -v github.com/projectdiscovery/... in SKILL.md.\n- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill instructs the agent to bypass standard Python environment protections during tool installation.\n
  • Evidence: Use of the --break-system-packages flag with pip install in SKILL.md.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing external data such as leaked credentials and target URLs.\n
  • Ingestion points: email, password, and target_sp_url parameters in the scripts within SKILL.md.\n
  • Boundary markers: None present.\n
  • Capability inventory: Network communication via urllib and Playwright, and local file writing via json.dump in SKILL.md.\n
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested external data is implemented.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 29, 2026, 06:48 AM