caveman-compress
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface. The skill processes user-specified files and interpolates their content directly into LLM prompts for compression. This creates a surface where malicious instructions within a file could attempt to override the agent's primary task.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/compress.pyreads content from files provided as arguments to the/caveman-compresscommand. - Boundary markers: The ingested content is appended to the prompt template under a
TEXT:header without additional sanitization or instruction-isolation delimiters. - Capability inventory: The skill has permissions to write files (overwriting the original) and execute shell commands (via the
claudeCLI). - Sanitization: No sanitization or structural validation is performed on the natural language content before it is sent to the LLM.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Local CLI Invocation. In
scripts/compress.py, the skill utilizessubprocess.runto call theclaudeCLI as a fallback when an API key is not present. This interaction uses fixed arguments (--print) and passes data via standard input, minimizing shell injection risks. - [SAFE]: Sensitive File Protection. The skill implements an explicit blocklist in
scripts/compress.py(is_sensitive_path) that prevents it from reading or processing files typically containing secrets, such as.env,.sshkeys, or AWS credentials, before any external API calls are made.
Audit Metadata