caveman-compress

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface. The skill processes user-specified files and interpolates their content directly into LLM prompts for compression. This creates a surface where malicious instructions within a file could attempt to override the agent's primary task.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/compress.py reads content from files provided as arguments to the /caveman-compress command.
  • Boundary markers: The ingested content is appended to the prompt template under a TEXT: header without additional sanitization or instruction-isolation delimiters.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has permissions to write files (overwriting the original) and execute shell commands (via the claude CLI).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or structural validation is performed on the natural language content before it is sent to the LLM.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Local CLI Invocation. In scripts/compress.py, the skill utilizes subprocess.run to call the claude CLI as a fallback when an API key is not present. This interaction uses fixed arguments (--print) and passes data via standard input, minimizing shell injection risks.
  • [SAFE]: Sensitive File Protection. The skill implements an explicit blocklist in scripts/compress.py (is_sensitive_path) that prevents it from reading or processing files typically containing secrets, such as .env, .ssh keys, or AWS credentials, before any external API calls are made.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 29, 2026, 10:40 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — caveman-compress