printing-press-output-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the stdout of external commands, which is passed to an LLM reviewer agent for analysis. This creates a surface where malicious content in the command output could attempt to manipulate the reviewer agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads sampled output from
/tmp/output-review-livecheck.json(Step 2) which contains raw command execution results in theoutput_samplefield. - Boundary markers: While the prompt is structured, there are no robust delimiters (e.g., XML tags or specialized escaping) for the content of the
output_sampledata to prevent it from escaping the intended data context. - Capability inventory: The reviewer agent is explicitly instructed to invoke additional commands via the
Bashtool to verify findings, providing a direct execution path if the agent is compromised by injected content. - Sanitization: The skill does not perform sanitization or filtering on the
output_sampledata before presenting it to the agent. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to executecli-printing-pressand other commands to generate and verify diagnostics. It invokes shell commands to gather research data and generate JSON reports. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a binary located at a path constructed dynamically from user-supplied arguments (
$CLI_DIR/<cli-name>-pp-cli). While this is central to the skill's purpose of reviewing a 'printed' CLI, it involves executing arbitrary binaries found in the target directory.
Audit Metadata