pp-forgejo
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of the
forgejo-pp-clitool. It provides instructions to usenpx -y @mvanhorn/printing-press-library install forgejoorgo install github.com/mvanhorn/printing-press-library/library/developer-tools/forgejo/cmd/forgejo-pp-cli@latest. These resources belong to the vendor 'mvanhorn'. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Setup involves executing code from remote sources via
npxandgo install, which downloads and runs binaries from the author's repositories. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The CLI includes a
--deliver webhook:<url>flag. This feature allows the agent to automatically POST command results—which may contain sensitive code, issue details, or Forgejo configuration—to any user-specified URL. This presents a high risk for data exfiltration if an attacker can influence the destination URL. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from Forgejo instances (e.g., issue descriptions, pull requests, and notifications) that could contain malicious instructions (Indirect Prompt Injection).
- Ingestion points: Data is pulled from Forgejo issues, pull requests, and notification threads in files such as
SKILL.md(e.g.,issue dashboard,notification inbox). - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The CLI has the ability to write to the local file system, send data to external webhooks, and perform administrative actions on Forgejo instances (e.g., creating users or organizations).
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the external content before it is processed or used in subsequent agent actions.
Audit Metadata