pp-forkable
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill implements a
--deliver webhook:<url>feature that allows the output of any command to be sent to an arbitrary external URL. This provides a direct mechanism for exfiltrating sensitive lunch data, including spend trends, delivery addresses, and order history. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The 'Automatic learning' loop (
teach,recall,playbook) stores and executes command sequences from local storage. This mechanism allows for dynamic command execution based on state that could be manipulated by an attacker to achieve persistent code execution. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The authentication mechanism (
auth login --chrome) is designed to extract session cookies directly from the user's browser, which are high-value authentication secrets. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of external binaries from the author's NPM package (
@mvanhorn/printing-press-library) and GitHub repository. While these are vendor-owned resources, they represent external code execution. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes data from the external Forkable web service. Evidence chain: 1. Ingestion points: Forkable GraphQL API responses processed by the CLI. 2. Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are present to prevent the agent from following commands embedded in the lunch data. 3. Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via the CLI, write to arbitrary files via
--deliver file, and perform network POSTs via--deliver webhook. 4. Sanitization: No sanitization of the external data is documented before it is processed by the agent.
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