pp-gl-inet
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions suggest using
npx -y @mvanhorn/printing-press-libraryto install the required CLI, which fetches code from the public npm registry. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation process uses
npx -y, which involves downloading and executing remote code without manual confirmation. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill features a
--deliver webhook:<url>flag that allows the output of any router command—potentially containing sensitive configuration data, IP addresses, and client lists—to be sent to an arbitrary external URL. It also supports aGL_INET_FEEDBACK_ENDPOINTwhich can be configured to automatically POST data to a remote server. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
rpc callfunctionality allows for the execution of arbitrary RPC commands and UCI configuration changes on the router, providing a high-privilege control channel over the device. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages and stores router administrative credentials and SSH keys within
credentials.tomland snapshot profiles. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its handling of untrusted environmental data.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads external data from the router API, including WiFi SSIDs and connected client names.
- Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat router-sourced strings as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The agent can invoke sensitive functions like
rpc call,vpn toggle, andvenue connectbased on the processed data. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or sanitization of data ingested from the network environment before it is used by the natural-language command resolver (
which).
Audit Metadata