pp-google-tag-manager

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs the google-tag-manager-pp-cli and an MCP server using npx and go install from the vendor's repositories.
  • Evidence: npx -y @mvanhorn/printing-press-library install google-tag-manager --cli-only and go install github.com/mvanhorn/printing-press-library/library/marketing/google-tag-manager/cmd/google-tag-manager-pp-mcp@latest.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides a --deliver webhook:<url> flag that allows the agent to POST command output to an arbitrary URL, which is a potential exfiltration vector.
  • Evidence: Description of the webhook:<url> sink in the Output Delivery section.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: An optional feedback mechanism can be configured to automatically send local data to a remote endpoint.
  • Evidence: GOOGLE_TAG_MANAGER_FEEDBACK_ENDPOINT and GOOGLE_TAG_MANAGER_FEEDBACK_AUTO_SEND environment variables.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill mirrors external GTM container configuration into a local database for processing, which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: GTM container data is ingested via the pull command.
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the skill instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses the Bash tool to execute the CLI, writes to a local SQLite database, and can perform network POST requests via webhooks.
  • Sanitization: No specific sanitization or validation of the GTM container content is mentioned.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 19, 2026, 05:48 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — pp-google-tag-manager