pp-mixlayer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data through various commands, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection if ingested files contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: The commands
shield scan,shield redact,shield ingest, andshield askinSKILL.mdaccept external file paths or raw text as input for processing. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat ingested content as untrusted.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes the
mixlayer-pp-clibinary, which has network capabilities and can write to the local file system. - Sanitization: While the tool provides PII redaction, it does not provide specific sanitization against instruction injection within the data.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The CLI includes features that allow data to be sent to external network endpoints.
- The
--deliver webhook:<url>flag enables POSTing command results to arbitrary external URLs. - The
feedback --sendcommand allows logs and feedback to be transmitted to an external endpoint if configured. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill operates by executing the
mixlayer-pp-clibinary through the shell. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill guides the installation of software from external vendor repositories.
- Fetches
@mvanhorn/printing-press-libraryfrom NPM. - Downloads the
mixlayer-pp-clisource from GitHub. - [METADATA_POISONING]: The
authorfield inSKILL.md(Cathryn Lavery) does not match the provided author context (mvanhorn), though all linked resources belong to the vendor infrastructure.
Audit Metadata