pp-mixlayer

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data through various commands, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection if ingested files contain malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: The commands shield scan, shield redact, shield ingest, and shield ask in SKILL.md accept external file paths or raw text as input for processing.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat ingested content as untrusted.
  • Capability inventory: The skill executes the mixlayer-pp-cli binary, which has network capabilities and can write to the local file system.
  • Sanitization: While the tool provides PII redaction, it does not provide specific sanitization against instruction injection within the data.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The CLI includes features that allow data to be sent to external network endpoints.
  • The --deliver webhook:<url> flag enables POSTing command results to arbitrary external URLs.
  • The feedback --send command allows logs and feedback to be transmitted to an external endpoint if configured.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill operates by executing the mixlayer-pp-cli binary through the shell.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill guides the installation of software from external vendor repositories.
  • Fetches @mvanhorn/printing-press-library from NPM.
  • Downloads the mixlayer-pp-cli source from GitHub.
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: The author field in SKILL.md (Cathryn Lavery) does not match the provided author context (mvanhorn), though all linked resources belong to the vendor infrastructure.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 14, 2026, 11:46 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — pp-mixlayer