pp-parallel

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 2, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill implements a --deliver webhook:<url> flag across its command suite, providing a built-in mechanism for the agent to exfiltrate research results, account metadata, and financial data to arbitrary external URLs.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains an indirect prompt injection surface through its local 'learning' and 'playbook' system. The agent is instructed to follow next_action and playbook steps retrieved from a local SQLite database that records previous research activity; this data could be poisoned by malicious content encountered during web research, leading to the execution of unintended commands.
  • Ingestion points: Output from parallel-pp-cli recall as described in Step 2 of the decision tree.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the agent is explicitly told to follow candidates and playbooks 'verbatim'.
  • Capability inventory: The CLI can perform financial transactions (account-add-balance), manage API keys, and access local research history.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the retrieved instructions is documented.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates high-risk administrative and financial operations, including charging payment methods (service account-add-balance) and generating/deleting API credentials (service account-create-key).
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs its core binary from official vendor repositories on GitHub (github.com/mvanhorn/printing-press-library) and NPM (@mvanhorn/printing-press-library).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 2, 2026, 08:50 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — pp-parallel