pp-parallel
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill implements a
--deliver webhook:<url>flag across its command suite, providing a built-in mechanism for the agent to exfiltrate research results, account metadata, and financial data to arbitrary external URLs. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains an indirect prompt injection surface through its local 'learning' and 'playbook' system. The agent is instructed to follow
next_actionandplaybooksteps retrieved from a local SQLite database that records previous research activity; this data could be poisoned by malicious content encountered during web research, leading to the execution of unintended commands. - Ingestion points: Output from
parallel-pp-cli recallas described in Step 2 of the decision tree. - Boundary markers: Absent; the agent is explicitly told to follow candidates and playbooks 'verbatim'.
- Capability inventory: The CLI can perform financial transactions (
account-add-balance), manage API keys, and access local research history. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the retrieved instructions is documented.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates high-risk administrative and financial operations, including charging payment methods (
service account-add-balance) and generating/deleting API credentials (service account-create-key). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs its core binary from official vendor repositories on GitHub (github.com/mvanhorn/printing-press-library) and NPM (@mvanhorn/printing-press-library).
Audit Metadata