pp-passage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
npxto download and execute code from the npm registry during the installation phase (npx -y @mvanhorn/printing-press-library install passage --cli-only). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to install the
passage-pp-cliusingnpx, which involves downloading a package from the public npm registry. This represents an external code dependency that is executed locally. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The CLI includes a
--deliver webhook:<url>flag that allows the agent to POST command results to a remote URL. This provides a built-in mechanism for sending data out of the local environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The CLI supports a
--deliver file:<path>flag, enabling the agent to write output to arbitrary file paths on the local system. This could potentially be used to write to sensitive locations if not properly constrained. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's 'Automatic learning' loop (Step 2 decision tree) creates a surface for indirect prompt injection. The agent is instructed to read
Playbook.notes'verbatim' and replayPlaybook.stepsretrieved from a local database of 'learnings'. - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the
Playbook.notes,Playbook.steps, andCandidatesfields returned by therecallcommand (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for the retrieved playbook content.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows shell execution of the
passage-pp-cliand provides capabilities for writing to local files and sending data to webhooks via the--deliverflag. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the retrieved 'learnings' is performed before the agent is instructed to follow the steps and notes 'verbatim'.
Audit Metadata