pp-printify
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the installation of the
printify-pp-clitool vianpxandgo installfrom repositories associated with the project developer. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The suggested installation workflows involve executing code retrieved from remote package registries and version control systems.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to run CLI commands for product automation, catalog browsing, and operational auditing. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The CLI supports a
--deliver webhook:<url>flag that allows command results (potentially containing sensitive shop or API data) to be transmitted to external URLs. Additionally, the feedback mechanism can send data to a remote endpoint ifPRINTIFY_FEEDBACK_ENDPOINTis configured. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted external data (CSV and JSON files) through multiple subcommands in
SKILL.md. It lacks instructions for boundary markers or sanitization, making it vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. \n - Ingestion points: Data is read from files specified via flags like
--product-file,--uploads-file,--manifest,--variants-file,--shipping-file,--csv, and--orders-fileinSKILL.md. \n - Boundary markers: Absent. No delimiters or warnings are specified to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded in the processed files. \n
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution capability is present via the
Bashtool as defined in theallowed-toolssection ofSKILL.md. \n - Sanitization: Absent. No sanitization or validation logic is defined for the content of ingested files.
Audit Metadata