pp-sendgrid

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to download and install a CLI tool using npx from @mvanhorn/printing-press-library and go install from github.com/mvanhorn/printing-press-library. These resources are owned by the skill's verified vendor and are used for the primary purpose of the skill.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies heavily on the execution of shell commands through the sendgrid-pp-cli binary, including installation commands and complex management tasks.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The CLI tool includes a built-in --deliver webhook:<url> feature that allows the agent to POST command results directly to any external URL. While intended for automation, this provides a direct channel for exfiltrating sensitive SendGrid data or customer PII if the URL parameter is manipulated.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes untrusted data from external sources.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads data from CSV files (suppression sync --from, suppression diff --against) and JSON payloads (templates lint --against).
  • Boundary markers: No explicit instructions are provided to the agent regarding the use of delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within these external files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the local filesystem (--deliver file:<path>, SQLite mirror) and transmit data over the network via the webhook delivery sink and the feedback command.
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization or validation of the content within the ingested CSV or JSON files before they are processed by the CLI or agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 9, 2026, 05:05 AM