pp-sendgrid
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to download and install a CLI tool using
npxfrom@mvanhorn/printing-press-libraryandgo installfromgithub.com/mvanhorn/printing-press-library. These resources are owned by the skill's verified vendor and are used for the primary purpose of the skill. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies heavily on the execution of shell commands through the
sendgrid-pp-clibinary, including installation commands and complex management tasks. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The CLI tool includes a built-in
--deliver webhook:<url>feature that allows the agent to POST command results directly to any external URL. While intended for automation, this provides a direct channel for exfiltrating sensitive SendGrid data or customer PII if the URL parameter is manipulated. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes untrusted data from external sources.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads data from CSV files (
suppression sync --from,suppression diff --against) and JSON payloads (templates lint --against). - Boundary markers: No explicit instructions are provided to the agent regarding the use of delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within these external files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the local filesystem (
--deliver file:<path>, SQLite mirror) and transmit data over the network via thewebhookdelivery sink and thefeedbackcommand. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization or validation of the content within the ingested CSV or JSON files before they are processed by the CLI or agent.
Audit Metadata