pp-sensortower
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the download of external code from the vendor's infrastructure:
- Downloads the
@mvanhorn/printing-press-libraryfrom the npm registry. - Installs the
sensortower-pp-clidirectly from the vendor's GitHub repository (github.com/mvanhorn/printing-press-library). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill operates by executing shell commands, including software installation via
npxandgo install, and running thesensortower-pp-clibinary. It also suggests backgrounding commands with the&operator (e.g.,sensortower-pp-cli teach ... &). - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill features an authentication command (
auth login --chrome) designed to import session cookies from the user's Chrome browser, which constitutes a sensitive credential harvesting operation. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The tool includes an output delivery feature (
--deliver webhook:<url>) capable of sending command results, which may contain sensitive app rankings or metadata, to an arbitrary external URL. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses a 'learning loop' (
recall/teach) that creates an indirect prompt injection surface: - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through 'learnings' and 'playbooks' stored in a local SQLite database (
data.db). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are used when retrieving stored learnings or replaying playbooks.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform network operations, file system writes, and shell command execution via the CLI.
- Sanitization: There is no automated sanitization of the queries or notes stored in the learning loop, relying instead on a manual 'PII rule' for the user to follow.
Audit Metadata