pp-sutra-fitness
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a potential surface for indirect prompt injection by processing data from an external source without explicit safety boundaries.
- Ingestion points: Data is retrieved from the Sutra (Arketa) Partner API and stored in a local SQLite mirror accessed by the agent.
- Boundary markers: There are no defined instruction delimiters or boundary markers to separate data content from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
BashandReadtools. The associated CLI tool supports writing output to arbitrary files (--deliver file:<path>) and sending data to external webhooks (--deliver webhook:<url>). - Sanitization: The documentation does not specify any sanitization or validation of the retrieved API data before processing.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
sutra-fitness-pp-clitool includes a--deliver webhook:<url>flag. This capability allows the agent to POST command results—which include sensitive studio data such as client lists, contact information, and revenue reports—to any external URL. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of external binaries from the vendor's repositories. It uses
npxto fetch the@mvanhorn/printing-press-librarypackage andgo installto fetch thesutra-fitness-pp-clisource fromgithub.com/mvanhorn/printing-press-library. These are identified as legitimate vendor-owned resources. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation procedures involve executing remote code via
npxand compiling/installing remote source code viago install.
Audit Metadata