pp-toodledo
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to install external software using
npx -y @mvanhorn/printing-press-libraryandgo install github.com/mvanhorn/printing-press-library/.... These commands fetch and execute code from the vendor's public repositories to provide the underlying CLI functionality. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill operates by executing the
toodledo-pp-clibinary through the shell. It supports a wide range of subcommands for task management, account inspection, and system diagnostics. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data from external sources.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested from the Toodledo API (tasks, notes, outlines) and from local files provided via the
--fileflag in thecapturecommand. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or delimiters are specified to isolate external data from agent instructions during command execution.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands, perform network operations (API calls and webhooks), and write to the local file system.
- Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization or validation of the content retrieved from the Toodledo API or local files before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata