pp-trigger-dev
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs the
trigger-dev-pp-clitool from the author's GitHub repository (github.com/mvanhorn/printing-press-library) usinggo installand from the@mvanhorn/printing-pressNPM package vianpx. These are documented as vendor resources. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Includes a
--deliver webhook:<url>feature that POSTs command results to a user-specified URL, which could be used to transmit sensitive run data, deployment information, or masked environment variable metadata. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes the
trigger-dev-pp-clibinary to perform management tasks against the Trigger.dev API. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to the ingestion of untrusted data from the Trigger.dev API (e.g., run payloads, error messages, and task metadata) via commands like
runs findandruns retrieve-v1. \n - Ingestion points: External data from runs and tasks is fetched and processed in the
SKILL.mdworkflows. \n - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters to isolate untrusted data from the agent's control logic. \n
- Capability inventory: The CLI can delete schedules (
schedules delete-v1), update waitpoints (waitpoints complete-token-v1), and compare environment variables (envvars diff). \n - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of external run content is described.
Audit Metadata