pp-twilio
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and installs the
twilio-pp-cliandtwilio-pp-mcpbinaries from the vendor's official GitHub repository atgithub.com/mvanhorn/printing-press-libraryusinggo install. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs the
@mvanhorn/printing-press-librarypackage from the npm registry usingnpxduring the setup process. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the
twilio-pp-clibinary to perform Twilio operations, including creating accounts, sending messages, and initiating calls. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides a
--deliver webhook:<url>flag, which allows the agent to POST the output of any command—which may include sensitive communication data, call recordings, or transcriptions—to an arbitrary external URL. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data such as incoming SMS messages and call transcriptions. Malicious instructions embedded in these external sources could influence the agent's behavior during analysis or automated response workflows.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context via commands like
messages-json list-message,tail-messages,recordings-json, andconversation. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any boundary markers or delimiters for the agent to use when processing external communication data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has extensive capabilities including file system writing (
--deliver file:<path>), network requests (--deliver webhook:<url>), and the ability to modify Twilio account configurations. - Sanitization: There are no explicit sanitization or filtering steps described in the skill for handling incoming message bodies or metadata before they are processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata