pp-workspace-admin

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires fetching the workspace-admin-pp-cli tool from an external third-party GitHub repository (github.com/mvanhorn/printing-press-library) and the NPM registry. These sources are not included in the global trusted vendor list, representing an unverifiable dependency for a tool that acquires significant administrative control over a Google Workspace domain.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation instructions utilize npx -y and go install to fetch and execute code from an external repository. The -y flag in the npx command allows for silent, automated execution of remote packages without user confirmation, which represents a remote code execution vector during the skill's setup phase.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The CLI tool includes an output delivery system supporting a webhook:<url> sink. This feature allows the results of any command—which contain highly sensitive Google Workspace metadata, PII, and security posture information—to be automatically POSTed to an arbitrary external URL, creating a direct path for data exfiltration if the agent is misdirected.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted organizational data (including Drive file metadata, Gmail message headers, and audit logs) into a local SQLite store for processing. This data is then used by the agent to drive high-privilege administrative actions.
  • Ingestion points: File, message, and user metadata from Google Workspace Directory, Drive, Gmail, Reports, and Alert Center APIs.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses the --agent flag to produce structured JSON output, but does not provide explicit instruction delimiters to isolate untrusted data from the agent's prompt context.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses powerful administrative capabilities including workflow offboard (suspend user, sign out, revoke tokens, move OUs), device-wipe, delete-filter, and send-message.
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization, validation, or filtering of the synced organizational data before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 13, 2026, 02:15 PM