pp-zoom
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 8, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to install the required CLI tool by downloading and executing code from external repositories.
- Evidence:
npx -y @mvanhorn/printing-press-library install zoom --cli-only. - Evidence:
go install github.com/mvanhorn/printing-press-library/library/productivity/zoom/cmd/zoom-pp-cli@latest. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The CLI includes an output delivery feature that can transmit the results of any command to a remote endpoint via a webhook. This poses a significant risk to meeting confidentiality as transcripts, summaries, and account details can be sent to non-whitelisted domains.
- Evidence: The
--deliver webhook:<url>parameter allows POSTing JSON data to any specified URL. - Evidence: The
feedbackcommand includes a remote-send capability controlled by environment variables likeZOOM_FEEDBACK_AUTO_SEND. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing shell commands to interact with the local filesystem and Zoom's data structures.
- Evidence: Commands like
storageandnotes ingestaccess local directories including~/Documents/Zoom/and~/Downloads/. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection through its document processing features.
- Ingestion points: The
notes ingestcommand reads untrusted PDF and DOCX files from the user's downloads folder. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks instructions for the agent to ignore or delimit instructions found within the ingested meeting notes.
- Capability inventory: The skill has extensive capabilities, including bash execution, file system access, and the ability to send data over the network via webhooks.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization for the content extracted from ingested files before it is indexed or searched.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata