orchestration-team
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function involves monitoring and capturing output from other agents (sub-agents) using tools like
rig capture,rig transcript, andrig queue. This ingestion of untrusted content from the fleet creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where a compromised agent could influence the orchestrator's behavior. - Ingestion points:
rig capture <session>,rig transcript,rig queue, andrig ps --nodes --json. - Boundary markers: None specified for isolating captured agent output or queue payloads from the orchestrator's instruction space.
- Capability inventory: The orchestrator has access to high-impact commands such as
npm publish,git push --force,rig down, andrig fork. These capabilities are powerful tools that could be abused if the orchestrator is successfully manipulated. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the captured transcripts or queue metadata before they are processed by the LLM.
Audit Metadata