mxs-cli-ai-author
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to interact with sensitive files and authentication credentials.
- Accesses
~/.config/mxs/credentials.json, which contains access tokens, refresh tokens, and user profiles. - Utilizes environment variables
MXS_TOKENandMXS_API_KEYto authenticate CLI operations. - While the skill mandates that the agent must not print these secrets, the requirement to handle and pass them as command arguments or environment variables poses an exposure risk.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs extensive operations by executing the
mxsbinary. - The agent is instructed to execute commands for resource management, including creation, modification, and deletion of posts, notes, and comments.
- The skill also allows modification of server-side settings via
mxs config setandmxs config edit. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external sources that could be controlled by an attacker to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The agent fetches content such as posts, notes, snippets, and comments from a remote mx-space server using commands like
mxs post getormxs comment list. - Boundary markers: The skill uses specific output modes like
--output llmand XML-like tags (e.g.,<mxpost>,<mxnote>) to structure data, but it lacks explicit instructions for the agent to ignore or sanitize commands embedded within the fetched content. - Capability inventory: The agent has the authority to perform mutations, deletions, and configuration changes on the server, which could be triggered by malicious instructions in the processed data.
- Sanitization: There is no mention of explicit sanitization or filtering of the fetched content before the agent processes it for further actions.
Audit Metadata