agent-browser
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct the installation of a global Node.js package from the official NPM registry.
- Evidence:
npm i -g agent-browser && agent-browser install(SKILL.md). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands via the Bash tool to perform all browser automation, desktop application interaction, and configuration tasks.
- Evidence: The
allowed-toolsfrontmatter grants access to theagent-browserCLI via Bash (SKILL.md). - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill employs a dynamic instruction-loading pattern where operational workflows and command references are fetched at runtime using the CLI.
- Evidence: Commands like
agent-browser skills get coreandagent-browser skills get electronare used to load specialized instructions after installation (SKILL.md). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: As a browser automation tool, the skill has a significant surface for indirect prompt injection when interacting with external web content or communication platforms like Slack.
- Ingestion points: Web pages, Electron application content, and Slack workspace data accessed via Chrome/CDP (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: None identified in the discovery stub; the agent is directed to load external workflows for specific guidance.
- Capability inventory: The tool can navigate pages, fill forms, click buttons, extract data, and interact with authenticated sessions via an "authentication vault" (SKILL.md).
- Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering logic is described in this high-level discovery stub.
Audit Metadata