get-api-docs
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 29, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs an external Node.js package
@aisuite/chubfrom the npm registry usingnpm install -g. This package is not from a recognized trusted organization or the skill author's verified scope. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By installing and then executing the
chubCLI tool, the skill enables execution of code from an external source on the host system. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands including
npm install,chub --help,chub search,chub get, andchub annotateto perform its tasks. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions explicitly direct the agent to "follow the instructions from the output of chub --help since that will be the latest guidance." This creates an instruction redirection vector where a potentially compromised or malicious CLI tool can provide arbitrary instructions that the agent is told to trust over its initial programming.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
chub feedbackcommand provides a mechanism to transmit data to an external service. While the skill includes a warning against including secrets, it remains a valid vector for data exfiltration. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection:
- Ingestion points: Documentation fetched via
chub getand persistent annotations stored viachub annotateinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None. The agent is not instructed to treat the fetched documentation as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands and install software.
- Sanitization: None. The agent directly processes content from external documentation and local persistent notes, which could contain instructions to poison future sessions.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata