opencli-autofix
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external websites to guide the agent through code repair tasks. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where a malicious website could include instructions in its DOM or API responses to manipulate the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads error traces (
summary.md,trace.jsonl), network logs (network.jsonl), and live website snapshots viaopencli browser stateandopencli browser network. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the processed artifacts.
- Capability inventory: The agent has permissions to
EditandWritefiles, as well as executeBashcommands foropencliandghtools. - Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or filtering of the external content is specified before the agent uses it to formulate code patches.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill's core functionality involves generating code patches and subsequently executing that code, which is a form of dynamic execution.
- Evidence: Step 4 instructs the agent to patch adapter source files (
adapterSourcePath), and Step 5 directs the agent to "Verify the Fix" by running the command normally usingopencli <site> <command>. If the patch generation logic is compromised via indirect prompt injection, the agent may execute malicious code locally. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently uses powerful CLI tools with arguments derived from trace data.
- Evidence: The skill uses
Bash(opencli:*)for website interaction andBash(gh:*)to create GitHub issues on thejackwener/OpenCLIrepository. Maliciously crafted data from a website could potentially lead to command injection if arguments are not properly handled by the agent.
Audit Metadata