meow-plan

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to interpolate user-provided planning requests and generated thread names directly into shell commands, such as mfl run --stage plan "<planning-request>" and mfl thread set name '<name>'. This creates a potential surface for command injection if the input contains shell-sensitive characters that escape the quoting mechanisms.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting data from external sources which may contain untrusted content.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads data into its context from the output of mfl thread status and mfl handoff get in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions within the processed tool outputs.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including executing subprocesses for the mfl, paseo, and git CLI tools.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the ingested data before it influences agent decision-making or is passed to other commands.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 19, 2026, 04:01 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — meow-plan